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In the late Spring of 1976, Delaware enacted legislation to
regulate takeover bids and tender offers made for domestic cor-
porations.' This action marks the most significant assertion of state
power over transactions that had previously been subject only to
the federal securities laws.2 Although Delaware was not the first
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Louis Loss of the Har-
vard Law School in preparation of this Article.
t Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1973, University of Virginia; J.D.
1976, Harvard Law School.
1 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2 On the relationship between state and federal-law in the securities field, see 1 L.
Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 103-05 (2d ed. 1961); L. Loss & E. Cowrr, BLUE SKY LAW
230-44 (1958); Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REv. 713 (1958); Jennings, The
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state to act,3 the number of businesses incorporated in Delaware
makes its law especially important.
During the business "growth" years of the 1960's there de-
veloped substantial pressure for change in the securities laws to
deal with takeover bids and tender offers.4 It was argued that
shareholders of target companies desired more extensive informa-
tion about the offeror and its plans for the target company in
order to make informed decisions about whether to "disinvest" by
tendering their stock, or to hold onto it and assume the risks
brought about by a change in control.5 It was also hoped that
offers made by "raiders"-those who seek control of the target in
order to improperly loot or liquidate it-would be discouraged, or
at least uncovered, by stricter disclosure requirements. 6 Previously,
the law required only insiders to make disclosure prior to trading
in securities, thus providing little protection against raiders. 7
Congress responded to this concern in 1968 by adopting the
Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,8
which require a minimum level of disclosure and prohibit fraudu-
lent practices in connection with takeover bids for corporations
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
under section 12 of the 1934 Act. In the same year, Virginia passed
tender-offer legislation, 9 and by the end of 1976, twenty-two other
states had followed suit.' ° Tender-offer laws have unusual impor-
Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
193 (1958); Millonzi, Concurrent Regulation of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for Congres-
sional Reappraisal, 49 VA. L. REv. 1483 (1963).
'See notes 9-10 infra.
' Tender offers are public solicitations for shares of a "target" company, generally in
exchange for cash at a price above the current market value of the shareholder's stock. For
a discussion of the mechanics of tender offers generally, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973); 1 J. FLOM, M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS-TENDER OFFERS AND GOING PRIVATE (1976); Fleischer & Mund-
heim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967); Hayes & Taussig,
Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135.
' See Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149
(1966).
6 See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 24665 (1967) (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 609 (1967).
8 15 U.S.C. § 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970). For a discussion of the legislative
history of the Act, see Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1969).
5 VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to 541 (1973).
'SSee ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (Cum. Supp. 1976); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§9 11-51.5-101 to 108 (Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 99 36-347a to 347m (West
Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to 15
(Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to 1513 (Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3-1
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tance, for in contrast to blue sky regulation," which controls only
transactions "occuring within the regulating state's borders," the
takeover laws cover solicitations made anywhere in the world if the
to 12 (Burns Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. §§ 17-1276 to 1285 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 292.560-.630 (Baldwin Gum. Issue 1976); Act No. 44, §§ 1500-1512, 1976 La. Sess. Law
Serv. 23-31 (West), [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 21,151-63 (to be codified as LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-:1512 (West)); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns. CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to
908 (Supp. 1976); ch. 121, §§ 1-13, 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 14-25 (Lawyers Co-op),
[1976] IA BLUE SKY L. REP'. (CCH) 24,261-73 (to be codified as MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN.
ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (West)); Pub. Act. No. 179, § 21.293(I)-(17) (Callaghan Current Ma-
terial, Aug. 23, 1976) (to be codified as MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.293(l)-(17)); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1976); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1973);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1601-1613 (McKinney Supp. 1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1975); Takeover Disclosure Law, Act No. 19, §§ 1-16, 1976 Pa.
Legis. Serv. 33-40 (Purdon), [1976] 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 41,181-96 (to be codified
as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon)); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to 47
(Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to 2114 (Gum. Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 61-4-1 to 13 (Interim Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West Spec. Pamph.
1976).
Two of the state statutes have been extensively discussed. See Sommer, The Ohio
Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 681 (1970); Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill,
43 OHIO BAR 65 (1970); Gibson & Freeman, The Thirteenth Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
1967-1968-Business Associations, 54 VA. L. REv. 1214, 1224 (1968); Vaughan, Tender Offers
in Virginia, 7 REv. SEC. REG. 879 (1974); Comment, Take-over Bids in Virginia, 26 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 323 (1969). See generally Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Stat-
utes and their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976).
In addition, a number of states have enacted takeover-bid statutes relating to insur-
ance companies. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1215.2 (West 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-39b (West Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-23-1 to 13 (Burns Supp. 1976); MD.
ANN. CODE, art. 48A, §§ 491-503 (1972 & Supp. 1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 401-B:1
to :16 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 69-a to 69-k (McKinney Supp. 1976); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 459.6-.7 (Purdon Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 617.12 (West Spec.
Pamph. 1976). Until 1970, the insurance companies were exempted from the registra-
tion requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because of § 12(g). 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(g)(2)(G) (1970). Tender-offer activity was regulated by the states if it was regulated at
all. In 1970, Congress amended the relevant Williams Act provisions, §§ 13(d) and 14(d),
to eliminate the exemption. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497
(amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1970)). Accordingly, the need for state regulation
was eliminated.
The state insurance statutes are similar to the tender-offer statutes, except that they
commonly grant the state insurance commissioner broader authority on which to disap-
prove bids. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48a, § 494(e) (1972). These statutes involve issues
of insurance law policy and federal-state allocations of competency that are beyond the
scope of this Article. It is not likely that the state statutes fall within the ambit of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1970), which provides that the "business
of insurance" shall be controlled by state legislation unless expressly preempted by federal
law. The investor-protection rationale of the tender-offer statutes seems to take them out-
side of "business" regulation. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 457-61 (1969);
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 4, at 171 n.82. But see Shipman, Some Thoughts About
the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 725
n.17 (1970).
"1See, e.g., L. Loss & E. Cowrr, supra note 2, at 17-2 1.
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target company has substantial contacts with the regulating state. 12
These state laws tend to impose more restrictions than the federal
legislation and hence have a greater impact on the offeror's con-
duct than the Williams Act when both state and federal law apply.
Although called "investor-protection" statutes by their sponsors,' 3
they have been criticized as little more than "parochial [attempts] to
protect incumbent management and local industry" by making
completion of a successful tender offer a near impossibility. 4
This Article will discuss the nature and propriety of state regu-
lation of tender offers. Part I, after briefly describing the Williams
Act, examines the purposes and effects of the state legislation. Part
II considers possible constitutional challenges to the validity of the
statutes. Part III suggests ways in which Congress might deal with
problems raised by the state laws in light of the American Law
Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code. 5
I
THE LEGISLATION
A. The Williams Act
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires a person or corpora-
tion that becomes the owner of five percent or more of any class of
the equity securities of a company registered pursuant to section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to file certain information
with the Securities Exchange Commission and the "target" com-
pany. Filing must occur within ten days after reaching or exceed-
ing the five percent ownership level. 6 Certain purchases are ex-
empted, most notably those failing to result in the acquisition of
more than two percent of the relevant class of securities over
a twelve month period.'" The purchaser must disclose its back-
12 These transactions need not have been of a wholly intrastate nature. See, e.g.,
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
'
3 See, e.g., Vorys, supra note 10, at 68.
E4 . ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 4, at 172. Indeed, the sponsors of the legisla-
tion were most often local associations of industrialists. See Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 1,
col. 6 (discusses Ohio and Idaho statutes); Vorys, supra note 10, at 66 (discusses Ohio
statute).
15 ALI FED. SEC. CoDE (Rptr's Revision of Text of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, Oct. 1974).
See generally Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27,
36 (1969).
16 Williams Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970).
171d. § 13(d)(6)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(B) (1970).
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ground and identity, its source of funds, and must state the pur-
pose of the acquisition and any plans it might have for major
changes in the operations or structure of the target.' 8 Section 14(d)
requires that an offeror required to file under section 13(d) also
file with the SEC any solicitation materials prepared in connection
with the offer, and that the solicitation materials contain certain
information included in the 13(d) statement.' 9 Such solicitation
materials must be sent to the target and the target's shareholders
simultaneously."0 Section 14(d) also allows tendering shareholders
to withdraw their shares during the first seven days of the offer or
sixty days after the date of the offer.2 ' When the number of shares
tendered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, the
offeror must buy from among the shares tendered in the first ten
days of the offer on a pro rata basis.22 If the offeror changes the
terms of the offer during its course it must apply those changes to
shares previously tendered. 23 Section 14(e) prohibits fraudulent
acts in connection with a tender offer.24 Section 14(f) requires that
an offeror, who plans to replace a majority of the board of directors
of the target without calling a shareholders' meeting, send to
shareholders a statement substantially similar to the proxy solicita-
tion required by the SEC in a normal election of directors.25
Like its counterpart state statutes, the federal act is designed as
an investor-protection law. The legislative history of the Williams
Act shows congressional concern for the interests of corporate
management. 26 Indeed, it has been suggested that the initiative for
the bill came from representatives of businesses subject to the
8 Id. § 13(d)(1)(A)-(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1970).
19 Id. § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970).20 Id.
21 Id. § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970).
22 Id. § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1970).23 Id. § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1970). In August 1976, the SEC proposed new
rules to implement the policiest of the Williams Act. 41 Fed. Reg. 33004 (1976). Among
other things, the proposed rules would give offerors increased access to target share-
holders lists, permit offerors to publish their offers in more summary form, require that
offers be held open for at least 15 business days, extend the amount of time that investors
have to withdraw their shares from seven to ten days from the start of the offer, and
permit an offeror to accept shares tendered on a pro rata basis throughout the life of the
offer.
24 Williams Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).25 1d. § 14(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1970).
26 See Loomis, Purchases by a Corporation of its Own Securities, 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
275, 279 (1967). See generally SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE
OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
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threat of takeover.2 7 Nevertheless, both the SEC and distinguished
commentators supported the final bill.2 8
The statute makes tender offers somewhat less desirable vehi-
cles for acquiring control of a target since it forces the offeror to
disclose information that he would normally prefer to keep con-
fidential.29 Critics of the Act charge that it discourages beneficial
takeovers because it does not distinguish takeovers that would re-
move inefficient management and offer a fair price to share-
holders from those aimed at "looting" the target, the evil the Act
sought to prevent.3 ° Clearly, the Act increases the possibility of
litigation for the offeror, and thus threatens to increase the cost of
an already expensive process. On the other hand, the federal law
gives shareholders the benefit of certain information about the
offeror and the offer, and such disclosure may induce other poten-
tial bidders to compete for control of the target, thus raising the
price offered for the target's shares.
The amendments as finally enacted evidence a congressional
decire to "avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."31
Although earlier versions of the bill were unabashedly anti-take-
over, the final version balances the interests of offeror and target
more evenly. Most importantly, the Act preserves the offeror's
right to move secretly and to announce his offer suddenly.3 2 This
balance has been abandoned in the "little Williams Acts. 33
2 7 Id
.21 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5.
29 See Brudney, supra note 7, at 624; Cohen, supra note 5, at 151-52.
31 See Brudney, supra note 7, at 623-25; Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply
to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 231, 244-45.
31 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY
OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1967); see Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975). See also Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969), where the
court stated:
Congress intended to assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose an un-
realistic requirement of laboratory conditions that might make the new statute a
potent tool for incumbent management to protect its own interests against the de-
sires and welfare of the stockholders.
12 See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 4, at 139 (need for secrecy in planning a tender
offer).
"See notes 34-41 and accompanying text infra. Two bills were introduced in Congress
that would amend the Williams Act by inserting provisions similar to those found in many
state statutes. S. 2522, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) would require that tender offers be
made only after an effective registration statement has been filed. This registration state-
ment would become effective 60 days after filing, unless otherwise ordered by the SEC.
[Vol. 62:213
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B. State Law-Coverage
All the state takeover statutes apply to non-"private" offers to
purchase equity securities of a corporation which has substantial
contacts with the regulating state, if such a purchase would result
in the ownership by the offeror of a defined percentage of those
securities.3 4 Different state laws elaborate on this basic framework
in varying and often complex ways.35
The most striking feature of the state laws is their extrater-
ritorial coverage: they apply to all transactions between the offeror
and the target's shareholders, so long as the target is in some way a
"local" enterprise. That no shareholders may live in-state is irrele-
vant: one of the first bids attacked and found wanting under the
Ohio law complied with the provisions of that law as to Ohio
shareholders, but failed to comply witi the law as to out-of-state
shareholders.3 6 Each of the statutes applies when the target com-
pany is incorporated in the regulating state. However some stat-
utes, like Hawaii's 37 do not apply unless the target does business
in-state. Most of the states regulate the takeover of targets incorpo-
H.R. 14317, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) would require that disclosure of a tender offer be
made to the SEC at least 30 days before the offer, and that a copy of the disclosure
statement be sent to the officers of the target company at least 21 days before the offer.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
§ 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (to be codified as 15 U.S.C. § 18a), amends the Clayton Act to
require that prior to the acquisition by certain large business organizations of 15% or more
of the voting securities (or if the aggregate amount of the voting securities and assets
purchased exceeds $15,000,000) of certain other large business organizations through a
cash tender offer, the offeror must wait for 15 days after notification pending investigation
of the antitrust consequences by the Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice. This Act imposes
a waiting period prior to purchase of the securities, not prior to making an offer to solicit
tenders. Thus the effect of the Act is to require that offers be kept open, prior to any
purchases, for 15 days from the date of notification (which presumably is the date of the
commencement of the offer). Since the Williams Act effectively requires that most offers
be kept open for at least 10 days anyway (see Williams Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6)
(1970)), the change in the law is not substantial. In the deliberations over the Act, the
drafters expressed their desire to preserve the speed and secrecy elements of the Williams
Act, while at the same time allowing for effective antitrust analysis. See H.R. REP. No.
1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4119,
4125-27.
34 See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1975).
35 One commentator has proposed a "model act" for state takeover-bid legislation.
Vaughan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 3 SEC. L. REv. 475 (1971). The same commen-
tator has described many of the provisions of the state legislation. Vaughan, State Tender
Offer Regulation, 9 REv. SEC. REG. 969 (1976).
3 See Sparton Corp. v. Ward, No. 243,230 (C.P. Ct. Franklin City, Ohio, Jan. 8,
1971), discussed in E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 4, at 161-62.
37 HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-1(5) (Supp. 1975).
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rated elsewhere if they have an in-state principal place of busi-
ness or some similar contact.38 New York regulates bids for cor-
porations having their principal places of business and substantial
assets in-stateA9 South Dakota extends extraterritorial coverage the
farthest by attempting to regulate the takeover of any target that is
incorporated, has its principal office, or has substantial assets lo-
cated in the state. 40 Some states may attempt to regulate the
takeover of the target parent based on the in-state contacts of its
subsidiary.4
This aggressive assertion of legislative jurisdiction points to an
apparent inconsistency with the professed purpose of the acts. The
legislation purports to be investor-protection oriented and is most
often made part of the state "blue sky" legislative provisions. The
ostensible purpose is to allow the investor to make an "informed"
choice to tender or to remain in the potentially reorganized corpo-
ration. Yet jurisdiction over the tender offer depends solely on the
contacts of the target corporation with the state, not on the in-
volvement of resident investors. Effective regulation of takeover
bids depends on regulatory statutes having extraterritorial scope; if
the state regulated only in-state transactions, the offeror could
avoid regulation by refusing to solicit from in-state shareholders.42
Clearly then, these laws should be analyzed as more analogous to
state corporation laws than to narrower blue sky laws, even though
the latter may occasionally apply to foreign corporations.43
Traditionally, a local interest in the target is sufficient under
the broad rule justifying jurisdiction when the "application of a
38 Delaware, Hawaii, Nevada, and Virginia are the exceptions. See DEL. CODE tit. 8,
§ 203(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-1(5) (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 38.37 (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-529(e) (1973). The determination of a corporation's prin-
cipal place of business is subjective. Thus, an offeror might be unable to determine
whether its planned tender offer will be subject to state regulation. In discussing the Ohio
law, one commentator has suggested that in determining a principal place of business,
Ohio courts will look to the "identity and location of the principal center of operational
control of the target's consolidated operations." Vaughan, State Tender Offer Regudation, 9
REV. SEC. REG. 969, 970 (1976).
19 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
40 S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-32-3 (Supp. 1976).
41 In the Imetal-Copperweld Corp. battle, Ohio based jurisdiction on the in-state loca-
tion of Copperweld's major operating subsidiaries. [1975] SEC. REG. & L. REP'. (BNA) No.
329, at A-6.4 1 See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
4' The states vary in their manner of codifying the tender-offer legislation. For exam-
ple, the Delaware proposal is part of the state's General Corporations law, while the Ohio
law is codified as a state securities statute. Compare DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp.
1976), with OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1975).
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state's [law is] to an act or a transaction occurring outside the bor-
ders of the state but having significant repercussions and reactions
within the state . . .'.,,44 However, unless other policies supporting
the state's power to act augment this jurisdictional basis, serious
conflicts arise when the interests of other states45 -the sharehold-
er's home state, for example-differ from those of the regulating
state. This problem is most serious when the target company has
only its headquarters in the regulating state and has the major por-
tion of its assets out-of-state.
In an important article focusing on the Ohio law,46 Professor
Shipman has invoked the internal-affairs doctrine to justify the
global reach of these statutes.47 That doctrine permits a dominant
state to control "the relationships inter sese of the corporation,
its directors, officers, and stockholders. ' 48 Shipman acknowledges
that takeover bids do not actually involve transactions that are
purely internal corporate matters, but he finds such offers suffi-
ciently analogous to certain corporate acts to allow regulating states
to exercise primary legislative jurisdiction over them. First, he
notes that the tender offeror is an "incipient" controlling person
who, if his bid is successful, will undertake fiduciary obligations
under state law. Hence, the regulating states can require disclosure
based on this potential relationship to the corporation.49 Addition-
ally, the local jurisdiction should have the right to protect against
overreaching transactions because a successful bid causes the
transfer of the "corporate asset" of control. 50 Finally, a successful
takeover may cause major changes in the composition of the
target's board of directors. Such shifts affect the voting power of
shareholders-a traditional concern of corporate law. 51 Although
Shipman finds none of these arguments alone "wholly satisfying,"
Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433, 444
(1968).
45 See Shipman, supra note 10, at 748-50.
4" Shipman, supra note 10.
" The internal-affairs doctrine has significance for adjudicative jurisdiction as well as
legislative jurisdiction. Courts consider the doctrine as a variation on the rule of forum non
conveniens, and defer to the courts of the state of incorporation to decide matters of
corporate policy.
48 Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of
Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1124 (1958). See also Gibson & Freeman,
supra note 10, at 1242.
49 Shipman, supra note 10, at 744.
50 d.
51 Id. at 744-45.
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the cumulative effect indicates ... that a takeover bid is similar
enough to a proxy solicitation so that the state of incorporation
can regulate the practices of insurgents in the former to substan-
tially the same extent as in the latter.
52
These analogies are persuasive, if somewhat too specific. An
examination of the policies underlying the rule of primary jurisdic-
tion strengthens Shipman's conclusion. The internal-affairs doc-
trine displaces otherwise controlling local law for a variety of
reasons-some constitutional, 53 but most pragmatic. 5 4 Uniformity
of participatory rights is necessary, for instance, to assure certainty
in corporate affairs, to ease the burdens of corporate administra-
tion, and to provide a single structure for "corporate democracy. '5 5
Otherwise, inter-forum conflicts might cause disruption in corpo-
rate affairs, discrimination among shareholders, and substantial
"forum shopping" by litigants. 56 For example, if each state in which
a corporation's shareholders were domiciled could apply its proxy
rules to the corporation, the validity of a corporate election might
depend solely on the forum in which the election was contested.
Such a rule would result in corporate chaos.
Similar arguments apply in the takeover-bid context.5 7 Al-
though investor protection may be the responsibility of the in-
vestor's home state, the incorporating state may also protect the
shareholders of a corporation in order to prevent corporate looting
and other undesirable consequences of a takeover. Similarly, the
state of incorporation might legitimately desire to promote equality
of treatment for shareholders by extending equal participatory
rights to all offerees in a tender offer. Since tender offers are
usually made to every shareholder of a corporation, each share-
holder should receive the same information, and should have con-
sistent rights and remedies available for his protection. 58 Thus,
52 Id. at 745.
" See Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84
HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971).
14 See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 48, at 1125-27.
" See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 306 (1969) (duty of control-
ling shareholders). These elements are present in case law and statutory law.
56 See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 48, at 1125.
"
7 But see Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1154-55 (1974). This discussion should not be confused with a consid-
eration of the constitutional validity of such legislation which is discussed in Part II infra.
" Otherwise, a judge applying local law to protect in-state shareholders could upset a
successful tender offer, while a judge in another state applying different law to the same
facts would be forced to uphold the offer. In this sense, shareholder rights would in fact
be unequal.
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although a transfer in control or ownership does not directly affect
the internal governance of the corporation, the internal-affairs
doctrine rests on policies suggesting that the one state with the
most easily identified contact with the target-the incorporating
state-should have "primary" legislative jurisdiction over tender
offers for control of its domestic corporations. 9
These strong policy arguments in favor of "primary" jurisdic-
tion for the state of incorporation do not apply with equal force to
states asserting jurisdiction based on the in-state location of the
corporation's "principal place of business" or assets. The difficulty
in determining a "principal place" of business creates the likelihood
that two or more states might assert their right to "primary" juris-
diction, thus removing the certainty the doctrine seeks to promote.
Moreover, both the incorporating state and the "principal place"
state are likely to assert a right to regulate. Therefore, justification
here must rest solely on the state's interest in protecting the local
assets of the target corporation from improper use. Most statutes,
however, attempt to do much more than offer the limited protec-
tion this rationale suggests would be appropriate. In this sense,
legislative jurisdiction based on the internal-affairs doctrine is
problematic.
It is of course crucial to the offeror to determine whether its
offer will be regulated in any particular state. Generally, a state will
regulate any tender offer for an equity security of a target com-
pany that might result in the offeror acquiring more than a set
percentage of the target's stock.6 0 Statutes cover both cash and
exchange offers61 and usually define equity securities to include
stock, convertible securities, warrants, and, in some states, any
other right which the local securities commission, in the interest of
" An exception is the case of "pseudo-foreign" corporations-those that are incorpo-
rated out-of-state but have all other significant contacts with the forum state. In this in-
stance, the forum state can generally apply its own law governing corporate affairs. See
generally Kaplan, supra note 44, at 447. California appears to be the most aggressive juris-
diction in imposing its corporate law on foreign corporations. See Western Air Lines, Inc.
v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961). But California does not go so
far as to regulate merely because of the in-state location of corporate headquarters or
substantial assets.
"
0 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 17-1276(a) (1974) (20%); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.01(5) (West
Spec. Pamph. 1976) (5%).
61 In most instances the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77q (1970), will cover
the exchange transaction, unless there is an exemption. If the transaction is federally regu-
lated, there are sufficient pre-effective delays so that the advantages of speed and secrecy
are lost, and incumbent management is well protected. Most of the discussion in the re-
mainder of this Article is directed at cash tender offers.
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investor protection, deems an equity security.6 2
In interpreting these definitions, many of the same problems
and solutions existing in federal securities law will reappear in the
state courts. 63 The vagueness of the term "equity security" in the
state acts parallels a similar difficulty in the Williams Act; thus,
state courts may choose to follow federal court decisions defining
"equity security." States may also follow federal law in defining
"tender offer" as any solicitation for the target company's shares
that might exert pressure on target company shareholders to make
uninformed, ill-considered decisions to sell, 64 even if such offers
are not organized as traditional solicitations. Presumably, only of-
fers made to all shareholders should be regulated. But in Utah, for
example, the definition envelops all "offer[s] to acquire . . . made
... directly or indirectly or through an agent by advertisement or
any written or oral communication to offerees. '' 65 Literally read,
the Utah statute suggests that a private offer to purchase made by a
single controlling shareholder may be regulated. That provision,
and similar ones found in other statutes, 66 may also be read to
regulate the private purchase of a large block of shares from a
controlling shareholder, especially if the purchase precedes or is
followed by a traditional tender offer.67 The Delaware law, on the
other hand, provides a clear definition of the kind of offer subject
to regulation by reaching "any offer to purchase or invitation to
tender equity securities for purchase made by an offeror to more
than 30 of the holders of equity securities .... .,68 In most cases,
however, the scope of state tender-offer statutes will depend on
judicial and administrative interpretations.
Exemptions, varying from state to state, remove particular of-
fers from the reach of the laws and thus narrow the scope of these
6 2E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.01(2) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976).
6 See generally In re EZ Paintr Corp. & Newell Cos., [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,063 (Wis. Comm'r of Sec., Jan. 30, 1973).64 1d. at 67,315-16. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1275-81 (1973).
65 UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-4-3(7) (Interim Supp. 1976).
66 For example, Nevada and Virginia have similar definitions, but both states expressly
exempt isolated offers-those not made to shareholders generally-from coverage. NEv.
REV. STAT. § 78.377(2) (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-529(i) (1973).
6 See In re EZ Paintr Corp. & Newell Cos., [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,063,
at 67,316.
68 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Under Delaware law a private sale
of a controlling interest in a corporation by one or more shareholders is exempt from
regulation. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 7309(b) (1974).
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definitional provisions. An interesting and significant exemption,
found in some form in all but four of the statutes,69 exempts from
regulation offers approved by the target board of directors;70 some
states, however, condition exemption on the disclosure to share-
holders of any inducements offered to the target's management
or directors that might have affected a recommendation in favor
of accepting the offer.71 Other states provide that an offer ap-
proved by the target is exempt only if it is made on the same terms
to all shareholders. 7 This exemption does not really protect inves-
tors because the position taken by the board of directors does not
affect the investor's decision of whether to tender. At best, the
exemption represents a legislative decision not to waste state
supervisory resources on uncontested bids. More likely, it demon-
strates the pro-management bias of the state statutes.73 Pennsyl-
vania deviates slightly from the majority rule in this area by requir-
ing at least some disclosure by the offeror in a "friendly" takeover,
but otherwise exempting a friendly offer from statutory re-
quirements. 4
Exemptions also typically apply to offers for control of corpo-
rations not registered under the federal securities laws, 75 offers for
corporations with less than some minimum number of share-
holders and/or amount of assets, 76 offers that would result in the
acquisition of less than two percent of any class of the target's
69 Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, and Nevada are the exceptions. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-347a to 347m (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Gum.
Supp. 1975); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to 15 (Supp. 1975); NEV. Rrv. STAT. §§ 78.376-
.3778 (1973); cf. Act No. 44, § 1500(11)(e), 1976 La. Sess. Law Serv. 24 (West), [1976]
IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 21,151, at 17,232 (to be codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:1500(11)(e) (West)) (approved offers not exempted if target defined as "natural re-
source company").
70 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Page Supp. 1975). Virginia
requires, in addition, that both the target board of directors and two-thirds of the target's
shareholders consent to the offer. The shareholders' consent must be obtained through a
solicitation of proxies that conforms to § 14(a)-(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
VA. CODE § 12.1-529(b)(v) (1973). Colorado differs somewhat by waiving the waiting pe-
riod when the board of directors of the target consents to the offer. COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 11-51.5-104(3) (Supp. 1975).
71 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Page Supp. 1975).
72E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(e) (Supp. 1976).
'3 See Shipman, supra note 10, at 750.
11 Takeover Disclosure Law, Act No. 19, § 8(a), 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 37 (Purdon),
[1976] 2 BLUE SKY L. RE'. (CCH) 41,188 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 78(a) (Purdon)).7 5E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(5)(c) (Supp. 1975).
7 6E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-1(8)(c) to (d) (Supp. 1975).
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equity securities, 77 ordinary brokers' transactions 7 isolated offers
not made to shareholders generally,7 9 certain registered exchange
offers,80 repurchase offers,8 ' and offers which the state securities
commission believes are not made for the purpose or have the
effect of influencing control over the target.82 Some states exempt
from coverage takeover bids that are subject to approval by federal
regulatory agencies.83 These exemptions have the net effect of
focusing state regulation on contested battles for the control of
important local industries.
In most regulating states, an "offeror" includes "each person
who makes or in any way participates in making a take-over bid. 84
Read literally, this definition might make anyone who participates
in the planning or execution of an offer liable for violations of
the state statutes. Thus, some states exempt certain employees,
broker-dealers, attorneys, accountants, lending institutions, and the
like.85
C. State Law-Disclosure and Administrative Supervision
All of the acts require an offeror to make certain disclosures to
offerees. In most of the regulating states, the state securities com-
mission has the responsibility for monitoring disclosure. 86 Most
state laws require a disclosure process similar to that attending the
public issuance of securities under the Federal Securities Act of
1933.87
In each state the offeror must file a detailed "registration
"E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11.51.5-102(5)(a) (Supp. 1975). Pennsylvania exempts trans-
actions involving acquisition by the offeror of target securities from fewer than 26 persons
over the preceding 12-month period. Takeover Disclosure Law, Act No. 19, § 3(vi), 1976
Pa. Legis. Serv. 37 (Purdon), [1976] 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 41,183 (to be codified as
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 73(vi) (Purdon)).
7 5 E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-32-2(1) (Supp. 1976).
71E.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 417E-1(8)(a) (Supp. 1975).
8 0 E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(b) (Supp. 1976).8 1 E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-2(6) (Supp. 1976).
8 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(5)(e) (Supp. 1975).
8 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(H) (Page Supp. 1975).
8 4 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(8) (Supp. 1975).
8 5E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(3) (Supp. 1976).
8 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1604-1606 (McKinney Supp. 1976) (vests supervi-
sory authority in state Attorney General); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 552.05 (West Spec. Pamph.
1976) (vests supervisory authority in commissioner of securities). But see MD. CORP. &
AsS'NS. CODE ANN. § 11-902 (Supp. 1976) (nonsupervisory).
87 Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 552.05 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976), with Securities Act of
1933, § 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 7 7 g (1970), and 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.401-.415 (1976) (Schedule A
of 1933 Act).
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statement" with the management of the target company and, in
most states, with the state securities commission. Most statutes re-
quire filing within a specified time period-ranging from ten days
in Colorado, 88 to sixty days in Hawaii 89-before the offer. Some
other states require, in addition, public disclosure of the offer at
the time of filing. 90 This requirement is intended to eliminate the
offeror's tactical advantage of "secrecy and surprise."9' During the
period between the filing of the required statement and the begin-
ning of the actual offer, the target company can execute defensive
maneuvers, such as forcing charter amendments, issuing additional
shares, arranging a "defensive" merger, or entering into competi-
tion with the offeror through an offer to repurchase. 92 Only Col-
orado expressly forbids the target management from actively op-
posing the offer during the waiting period; 93 in other states, the
target can shower shareholders with adverse publicity warning
them not to accept the offer well before the offeror is allowed to
send its first mailing.94 During the waiting period, activity by
arbitrageurs95 often raises the market price of the offeree's stock,
thus cutting down the value of the offeror's premium for tender.
11 COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-104(1) (Supp. 1975). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (to be codified
as 15 U.S.C. § 18a) adds an overlay of five days to the waiting period required by Colorado
law. See note 33 supra.
19 HAw. REv. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (Supp. 1975).
go IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(1) (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03(1) (West Supp.
1976); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1975); Takeover Disclosure
Law, Act No. 19, § 4(a), 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 34 (Purdon), [1976] 2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 41,184 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74(a) (Purdon)); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 552.05(1) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976).
91 See Vorys, supra note 10, at 68. The Delaware law waives the waiting period re-
quirement for offerors who enter into competition with a pre-existing offeror during the
course of the latter's offer. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
92 For general discussions of various defensive tactics, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
supra note 4, at 219-76; Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest
Analysis, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 613, 642-49 (1970); Hayes & Taussig, supra note 4, at
142-47. Improper acts by the targets management may result in liability under federal or
state law. Nonetheless, management has substantial freedom to act on its "business judg-
ment." See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964).
" COLO. REv. STAT. § 11.51.5-104(5) (Supp. 1975).
" See Shipman, supra note 10, at 763.
" Arbitrageurs purchase shares of stock subject to a tender offer on the open market
at the lower market price in the hope of then tendering at the higher offer price. In doing
this, they assume the risk that, for some reason, some or all of the tendered shares will not
be accepted by the offeror. The increased demand for shares generated by arbitrage activ-
ity places an upward pressure on the market price of the stock. As a result, the difference
between the offer and the market price is reduced-as is the incentive to tender. See E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 4, at 177-80.
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
These possibilities increase the risk that the takeover bid will fail.
The waiting period allows the target's shareholders to consider
the virtue of the offer free from the pressure that normally ac-
companies a tender decision and to make that decision after being
fully informed of the target management's opinion of the merits of
the offer. However, the waiting period may not rationally serve this
purpose; it may cause a bid to fail for reasons unrelated to its
merits. Presumably, the information management disseminates
during the waiting period provides shareholders with some means
of "valuing" the enterprise. The target's management might at-
tempt, for instance, to prove that the offer price is too low, thus
encouraging its shareholders to "wait it out. '96 But there is no
reason for disclosing this data only prior to a takeover, rather than
at some other time. Shareholders selling shares on the open market
are as mitch in need of any "undervaluation" data as those evaluat-
ing a ten er request. In a consistent system of disclosure a corpora-
tion should periodically provide material data on valuation, not
only before a takeover bid.97 Any information that the target man-
agement publicizes solely in response to a takeover bid is likely to
be self-serving, and therefore suspect. A waiting period might
provide other advantages to the target's shareholders, such as
enabling them to consult their brokers on the desirability of tender-
ing or giving the target company time to summarize previously
disclosed data for those shareholders who had not previously con-
sidered selling their shares. Nevertheless, the undesirability of en-
couraging an incumbent management's defensive campaign may
well outweigh these benefits.98
The original pro-management version of the Williams Act,
96 For example, the book value or the liquidation value of the target corporation's
stock may be well above the market price, either because of market expectations about the
company's future or because of unrelated external economic factors. In the latter case, a
change in external conditions may cause the market price of the shares to rise. In such a
case, management may wish to inform shareholders of this fact and thereby encourage
them to wait for "better times" rather than sell immediately.
9' Moreover, if management has a legitimate corporate reason for withholding the
data, that reason should be no less compelling because of the tender offer. The informa-
tion that shareholders need in making decisions about whether to buy or sell their shares is
predictive, rather than historical data, and yet the securities laws do not compel full dis-
closure of predictions or projections. See Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and
Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1197-1201 (1970). The waiting period does not
remedy this shortcoming in disclosure.
8 But see P. ANISMAN, TAKEOVER BID LEGISLATION IN CANADA: A COMPARATIVE ANAL-
Ysis (1974), reviewed in Coffey, Book Review, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 268 (1975). Given these ar-
guments against the waiting period, the less restrictive alternative of an extended with-
drawal period for prior tendered shares is clearly more desirable.
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first introduced in 1965, contained a twenty-day waiting period
requirement.9 9 The SEC objected to the provision on the grounds
that it unfairly favored incumbent management, and also argued
that the purposes of the waiting period would be better furthered
if shareholders were permitted to withdraw their shares during
some period in the course of the offer.1"' The provision was then
deleted and did not appear in the proposal debated in Congress.
The disclosure requirements vary from state to state. South
Dakota's disclosure requirements are identical to those mandated
by the Williams Act, and a copy of Schedule 13D 1°0 may be filed in
satisfaction of the state requirements.10 2 Ohio, by contrast, requires
the filing of an extensive disclosure statement resembling a combi-
nation of a federal S-1 registration statement'0 3 and a Schedule
13D. 10 4 Ohio requires disclosure of the identity of the offeror, its
source of funds for the offer, its plans or proposals for altering the
structure or operations of the target, its prior ownership of target
shares, and any contracts or arrangements it might have with re-
spect to the target securities. Ohio also demands information about
the offeror's organization and its capital structure. Copies of recent
financial statements, descriptions of its major properties, any pend-
ing litigation that might create contingent liability for the offeror,
descriptions of the business "done and projected" by the offeror,
the names and biographical summaries of the offeror's directors
and principal officers, and information concerning material
transactions between the offeror and its officers and directors
must be produced. Any other data deemed necessary by the Divi-
sion of Securities for "full, fair and effective" disclosure will also be
required. 10 5 Pennsylvania requires disclosure of the effect of the
proposed change in control on certain labor relations matters. 0 6
Proponents of the state statutes contend that disclosure may
force tendering shareholders to look beyond the price offered for
99S. 2731, § 10(c), 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REC. 28259 (1965). See Cohen,
supra note 5, at 152. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (to be codified as 15 U.S.C. § 18a) now requires a
15-day waiting period in some transactions. See note 33 supra.
10 The SEC memorandum is reprinted in 112 CONG. REC. 19003, 19005 (1966).
101 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1976).
102 S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §§ 47-32-5, 47-32-6 (Supp. 1976).
103 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1976) (authorization).
'
0 4 See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 4, at 159.
105 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(3)(h) (Page Supp. 1975).
106 Takeover Disclosure Law, Act No. 19, §§ 5(4), 8, 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 37 (Purdon),
[1976] 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 41,185, at 37,339, 41,188 (to be codified as PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, §§ 5(4), 8 (Purdon)).
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their shares and consider the effect of the tender on the local
community.10 7 They also argue that if the offeror is a known
"raider," shareholders may refuse to sell.'"" Shareholders might
also retain their shares, hoping to participate in future earnings, if
the offeror's management has a good reputation. But extensive dis-
closure does not assist the shareholder in making the key economic
evaluation in deciding whether to tender. The shareholder must
assess the relation of the price offered to the value of the target
under current management. 9 The target's management is more
likely to have such information than is the offeror. Thus, the in-
formation disclosed is of little consequence except to the rare
shareholder who places incumbent local interests above pecuniary
gain. Such shareholders are generally privy to the operations of the
target and are likely to obtain the desired information directly
from the target without compulsory disclosure. 10 Moreover, by
disclosing the adverse consequences of refusing to tender, an of-
feror may "whipsaw" a shareholder into tendering. Disclosure of
such adverse consequences need not and should not be compelled.
In short, the financial cost of disclosure to the offeror outweighs
any minimal benefit to the shareholder. At best, disclosure pro-
vides the "disinfectant" of publicity to discourage questionable bids.
Yet, the Williams Act seems adequate for this purpose.
In Delaware, Colorado, Maryland, and Nevada, the offer may
proceed without further supervision after disclosure."' Idaho has
no waiting period, but requires express approval of the securities
commissioner before an offer can go forward." 2 The remaining
107 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 49 (1967) (analogous legislative history in
debate of Williams Act); 113 CONG. REC. 24665 (1967) (remarks of Senator Kuchel). On
the Ohio law, see Vorys, supra note 10, at 68.
1o. Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 49 (1967) (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
:09 See Brudney, supra note 7, at 616-20.
10 Id. Much of this data must be disclosed under the Williams Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1970). To the extent that coverage overlaps, a state requirement is
unnecessary.
. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-104(3) (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 11-902 (Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78.3771 (1973). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (to be codified as 15 U.S.C. § 18a) extends the required
waiting period to 15 days in some tender-offer situations. See note 33 supra.
112 IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Supp. 1976); cf. Act No. 44, §§ 1500(6), 1501(E), (G),
1976 La. Sess. Law Serv. 26 (West), [1976] IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 21,151, 21,152,
at 17,233 (to be codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500(6), 51:1501(E), (G) (West))
(same requirement for "natural resource" companies).
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states allow an offer at the expiration of the waiting period, unless
the securities commissioner orders a hearing.'1 3 The Commission
may order this hearing on its own motion, and in some states must
do so if the target's management requests it.1 14 In Minnesota and
South Dakota a set percentage of the target's shareholders may also
request a hearing.-"5 Virginia and Kentucky require the target's
management to show good cause before their request for a hearing
may be granted." 6 A majority of the states grant a hearing simply
if the target demands it." 7 In these states, therefore, the target's
management can extend the waiting period by demanding a hear-
ing no matter how frivolous its objections. Most states set deadlines
for the calling of the hearing and for the issuance of a decision by
the hearing officer. In Ohio, for instance, a hearing must be held
within forty days after the required information has been filed with
the Division of Securities and the target company." 8
The New York Stock Exchange has objected to the delay oc-
casioned by the waiting period." 9 With respect to the Ohio statute,
the Exchange noted:
During the 20-day period, there could be rumors, counter-offers
and rumors of counter-offers which may result in price fluctua-
tions to the extent that the market in the stock would be dis-
rupted. This may make it necessary for the Exchange to tem-
porarily halt trading in the stock. In some cases, trading may be
halted for the duration of the 20-day period.
The impact of the Ohio law would thereby be felt by in-
vestors throughout the Nation who would be deprived of a mar-
ket for the securities they hold in the Ohio company.120
The Exchange's arguments apply with even more force to the addi-
tional delay occasioned by the hearing procedure.' 2 '
113E.g., ch. 121, § 2, 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 17 (Lawyers Co-op), [1976] IA BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 24,262 (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 110C, § 2
(West)).
114 E.g., Act No. 44, § 1501(E), 1976 La. Sess. Law Serv. 26 (West), [1976] 1A BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 21,152, at 17,233 (to be codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1501(E)
(West)).
"5 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03(4) (West Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN.
§ 47-32-23 (Supp. 1976).
116 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.570c (Baldwin Cum. Issue 1976); VA. CODE § 13.1-
53 l(a)(ii) (1973).
"'E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-32-23 (Supp. 1976).
11s OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1975).
9 See [1969] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at A-i1.2 0 Id. at A-12.
121 See Sommer, supra note 10, at 700.
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The hearing is designed to determine whether the offeror has
made "full and fair disclosure."'122 Under this standard, a hearing
officer could conceivably look at the adequacy of disclosure not
only for the reasonable investor, but also for the "ethical" investor
or nafive investor. 123 If the disclosure meets the statutory standards,
the hearing officer must approve the offer; if it does not, he may
require such additional disclosure as is deemed necessary to bring
the offer into compliance with the statute.
Seven states-Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin-also require that the offer as a
whole be "fair and equitable,"'124 a standard similar to that imposed
on public issues of stock under some blue sky laws. Thus a hearing
officer might disapprove of an offer if he determines that the price
offered is inadequate. Fortunately, in the only published decision
interpreting such a provision, the Wisconsin Securities Commission
has held that the adequacy of the price offered is to be tested in the
market and not in a hearing. 25
For attempted takeovers of local companies which are develop-
ing substantial mineral deposits in Louisiana, that state requires the
State Mineral Board to find that the offeror has shown by clear
and convincing evidence that the takeover offer "will provide a
positive benefit to this state, its citizens, and its resources, particu-
larly with respect to the discovery, development, preservation and
utilization of the mineral and other natural resources of this
state.' 26 This standard of review makes it unlikely that any out-
of-state offeror will be permitted to make such a bid unless its
political power outweighs that of the incumbent managers. In
its candid abandonment of the investor-protection rationale,
then, Louisiana has enacted the most "parochial" of all the state
statutes.'
27
122 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 17-1277(b) (1974).
123 See Vorys, supra note 10, at 72.
124 See HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-3(g) (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-2(f)
(Burns Supp. 1976); Act No. 44, § 1501(F), 1976 La. Sess. Law Serv. 26 (West), [1976] 1A
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 21,153, at 17,233 (to be codified as LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:1501(F) (West)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03(5) (West Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 47-32-27 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2104(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 552.05(5) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976).
M In re EZ Paintr Corp. & Newell Cos., [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,063, at
67,318 (Wis. Comm'r of Sec., Jan. 30, 1973).
126 Act No. 44, § 1501(G), 1976 La. Sess. Law Serv. 26 (West), [1976] IA BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 21,152, at 17,233 (to be codified as LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1501(G)
(West)).
127 Id.
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Several state statutes contain disclosure provisions other than
filing and review requirments. For example, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Ohio, and Tennessee forbid offers by an offeror who has
purchased a specified percentage of the target's stock within the
previous twelve months and has not disclosed an intention to make
an offer at the time of the prior purchase. 12 This provision re-
stricts the power of the potential offeror to test the market or
to buy a block of the target's shares without paying a tender
premium. 29 However, the provision has the healthy effect of as-
suring equality of treatment among the target's shareholders.
Idaho, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin impose own-
ership-information filing requirements similar to those in section
13(d) of the Williams Act.' 30 These provisions require anyone pur-
chasing large blocks of shares over a short period of time to file
information substantially identical to that filed prior to a tender
offer. Idaho, Minnesota, and Wisconsin augment this rule by pro-
viding that no tender offer may be made within sixty days after
such a filing, if the filing was delinquent.' 3 ' Alaska, Virginia, and
Nevada require the filing of an information statement substantially
identical to that required by the SEC proxy rules, if the offeror
intends to elect new directors or to replace a majority of the
target's old directors.' 32 This provision parallels section 14(f) of the
Williams Act.' 33
D. State Law-Substantive Regulation
Each regulating state places limitations on the conduct of the
takeover bid once it has been approved. Massachusetts and Michi-
128 KAN. STAT. § 17-1277(b) (1974); ch. 121, § 3, 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 17
(Lawyers Co-op), [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 24,263 (to be codified as MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 10C, § 3 (West)); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(2) (Page Supp.
1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2103(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
129 See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 4, at 139 (discussion of need for prior purchases).
1"' Compare IDAHO CODE § 30-1502 (Supp. 1976), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.02 (West
Supp. 1976), and S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-32-5 (Supp. 1976), and Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 552.03 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976), with Williams Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
131 IDAHO CODE § 30-1502(6) (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.02(8) (West Supp.
1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.03(7) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976). In In re EZ Paintr Corp. &
Newell Cos., [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,063, at 67,313 (Wis. Comm'r of Sec.,
Jan. 30, 1973), the Commissioner read the term "delinquent" as meaning either late or
misinformative in content.
132 ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.020(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976); NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.3771(3) (1973);
VA. CODE § 13.1-531(d) (1973).
,32 Even states with no takeover-bid legislation may require broker-dealers involved in
a solicitation to register with the local securities commission if in-state shareholders are to
be solicited. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25210 (West Supp. 1976); Nationwide Inv. Corp. v.
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gan require that the offer remain open for at least sixty days.134
Delaware has a twenty-day period, with ten-day extensions each
time the terms of the offer are changed.' 35 If there is any increase
in offering price during the course of the offer, most states re-
quire prior tendering shareholders to share in the increase.'
36
Massachusetts effectively requires the purchase of all shares
tendered, even if the offeror states that he wishes only to purchase
a certain percentage of the target's shares.' 37 All other states, ex-
cept Delaware, Hawaii, and New York, require pro rata purchases
if less than all tendered shares are purchased; 38 some follow the
Williams Act, however, and apply the pro rata requirement only to
shares tendered during the first ten days of the offer.' 39 In states
without the ten-day limitation, the rule may increase the carrying
expense of maintaining an open line of credit, since the offeror will
wait until the end of the offer period before making any pur-
chases.' 4 ° The Delaware law forbids purchases during the first
twenty days of the offer and during the ten days following any
alteration of the terms of the offer.
14 1
Most states also permit tendering shareholders to withdraw
their shares within set time limitations. The Williams Act permits
withdrawal during the first seven days of the offer and sixty days
after the date of the offer; 42 Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have adopted
the same rule. 143 Indiana allows withdrawal until three days prior
California Funeral Serv., Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 494, 114 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1974). They thus
would be subject to relevant regulatory and anti-fraud rules.
13. Ch. 121, § 7, 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21-22 (Lawyers Co-op), [1976] 1A BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 24,267 (to be codified as MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I l0C, § 7
(West)); Pub. Act. No. 179, § 21.293(l)-(17) (Callaghan Current Material, Aug. 23, 1976)
(to be codified as MicH. STAT. ANN. § 21.293(2)).
135 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
136E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-35 (Supp. 1976).
137 Ch. 121, § 7, 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21 (Lawyers Co-op), [1976] IA BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 24,267 (to be codified as MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. ll0C, § 7 (West)).138 E.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(3) (1973). Delaware does not impose a pro rata
purchase requirement.
139 E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-34 (Supp. 1976).
140 Of course, when the offer is for less than all of the target's securities, the offeror
will have to wait anyway in order to determine if the stated percentage has been tendered.
Thus, the pro rata rule will not be of major consequence to many offerors.
141 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976). This delay allows for more workable
judicial intervention.
142 Williams Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970).
143 IDAHO CODE § 30-1506(2) (Supp. 1976); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS. CODE § 11-905(B)
(Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.06(2) (West Supp. 1976); Takeover Disclosure Law,
Act No. 19, § 7(a), 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36-37 (Purdon), [1976] 2 BLuE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
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to the expiration of the offer,'44 and Nevada and Virginia permit
withdrawals during the first twenty-one days of the offer.145 The
Delaware provision permits withdrawals at any time during the
offer.146
Many states, in an effort to ensure personal jurisdiction over
the offeror, require that offers to in-state shareholders be made on
the same terms as those to out-of-state shareholders. 147 These pro-
visions do not guarantee personal jurisdiction over the target be-
cause in these situations personal jurisdiction is predicated on the
offeror's contact with the target and not with the shareholders. If
equality of treatment of shareholders is the goal, then the statute
should simply require that an offer be made on the same terms to
all shareholders. Protecting only in-state shareholders is the worst
sort of parochialism. 148
Some states forbid the offeror from acquiring stock of the tar-
get during the course of the offer, except pursuant to that offer; 149
others require the offeror to bid for all the target's shares.' 50 In
some states a copy of the information statement must accompany
or precede all offers.' 5 ' Some states grant the offeror access to the
target's shareholder lists.' 52 Massachusetts prevents the use of in-
termediary brokers in the offer process by prohibiting the offeror
from paying commissions or fees to any offerees. 53 Finally, most
statutes contain broad anti-fraud provisions similar to section 14(e)
of the Williams Act. 1 54
41,187 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 77(a) (Purdon)); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 47-32-33 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2103(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 552.11(2) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976).
144 IND. CODE ANN. § 23-3-3-5(a) (Burns Supp. 1976).
143 NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.3772(2) (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-530(b) (1973).
146 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
147 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1975).
148 Shipman, supra note 10, at 750.
149 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-4(d) (Burns Supp. 1976). A similar federal provision
was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Rule
lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1976).
15'E.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-3 (Supp. 1975). Offerors often wish only to obtain a
sufficient number of shares to be able to effect either a negotiated or short-form merger
with the target.
151 E.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(5) (1973).
151 E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-32-12(3) (Supp. 1976) (if offeror is also share-
holder).
153 Ch. 121, § 7, 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 21-22 (Lawyers Co-op), [1976] IA BLUE
SKY L. REP'. (CCH) 24,267 (to be codified as MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110C, § 7
(West)).
154 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.09 (West Spec.
Pamph. 1976). In general, most of the substantive provisions implement the disclosure
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In a departure from the anti-takeover character of most of
these regulatory provisions, nine states forbid controlling share-
holders from selling their stock to the offeror at a premium above
the general offer price during the course of the offer.' 55 Utah
explicitly forbids a controlling person from selling at a price higher
than the fair market value of the stock or the price offered
generally. 156 Other states achieve a similar result by requiring that
the offeror treat all shareholders alike.' 5" These provisions may
effectively bar "creeping acquisitions," where the sale of a control-
ling person's shares either immediately precedes or follows a gen-
eral offer. 5 8 The provisions preserve shareholder equality inter sese
and are in accord with recent suggestions that all shareholders
should benefit equally from the sale of corporate control. 59
E. State Law-Enforcement
The state statutes contain various enforcement provisions. 60
Most give the state securities administrator authority to seek in-
policy, though some also restrict the offeror's ability to complete a successful tender offer.
In early 1976 Ohio adopted, on an emergency basis, a set of very restrictive rules which:
(a) prohibited tender offers for less than all of a target's shares; (b) required that offers be
kept open for at least 60 days; (c) required offerors who acquire more than 50% of a
targets shares to make a subsequent 30-day offer to purchase the remainder; and (d)
prohibited an offeror from paying to any offeree a fee or commission not granted to all
offerees. See [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 339, at A-11. These emergency rules
were revoked soon after their implementation. See [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
341, at A-23.
1. IDAHO CODE § 30-1505(2) (Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-4(c) (Burns Supp.
1976); Act No. 44, § 1503(3), 1976 La. Sess. Law Serv. 27 (West), [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 21,154 (to be codified as LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1503(3) (West)); MD.
CORP. & Ass'Ns. CODE ANN. § 11-904(b)(2) (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.05(2)
(West Supp. 1976); S. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-12(2) (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-2106(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-4-7(3) (Interim Supp. 1976);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.09(3) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976).
:56 UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-4-7(3) (Interim Supp. 1976).57 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(e) (Supp. 1975). Offerors often pay brokers
and dealers a small commission for all shares tendered through them. See E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, supra note 4, at 187-91. These rules do not clearly prohibit such a practice; the
policy of promoting shareholder equality suggests that a commission can be paid to one
who purchases the shares solely in order to participate in the offer, for he is not a "share-
holder" ii the traditional sense of the term.
58 See In re EZ Paintr Corp. & Newell Cos., [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,063,
at 67,316 (Wis. Comm'r of Sec., Jan. 30, 1973).
5' See, e.g., Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HARV. L. REv. 505 (1965).
160 In addition to procedural methods of enforcement, most states give the state se-
curities commission the authority to promulgate substantive rules. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 552.13(2) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976).
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junctive relief against offerors who violate the law.a61 In Indiana
and Michigan, the target company is also empowered to seek an
injunction. 162 In Hawaii and Utah, the administrator may issue a
stop order suspending the effectiveness of the offeror's registration
statement. 163 The statutes effect no change in the normal equitable
powers of the courts; hence, the target may be able to enjoin an
illegal offer even in states where it is not specifically authorized to
do so. In most states willful violation of the law by the offeror or
the target management leads to criminal sanctions.' 6 4
Finally, the states generally provide civil remedies for ag-
grieved shareholders. 65 Shareholders in most states may sue for
rescission or damages upon proof that the offer was either
fraudulent or not made in compliance with the law. 16 6 These pro-
visions usually contain no scienter requirement; they cover "any
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
.... ,,167 Indiana and Louisiana allow non-tendering shareholders
to sue.' 68 The civil remedies are designed to force the offeror to
disclose any fact that might be remotely relevant to the decision to
tender.
Most states also provide for joint and several liability of par-
ticipants in the offer. Idaho makes controlling persons of the of-
feror, broker-dealers, partners, principal executive officers, and
employees-if they materially aided in the transaction-liable to
the same extent as the offeror; the provision, however, permits a
.
6 1 E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-8 (Supp. 1975).
... IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-8(b) (Burns Supp. 1976); Pub. Act No. 179, § 21.293
(17)(2) (Callaghan Current Material, Aug. 23, 1976) (to be codified as MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 21.293(1)-(17)).
163 HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-4 (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-4-8 (Interim Supp.
1976).
164 Penalties vary from state to state. Idaho provides up to a $5,000 fine and/or three
years in prison for violation of its law. IDAHO CODE § 30-15101 (Supp. 1976). Indiana has a
system of graded offenses for different types of violations. The maximum penalty is im-
posed on those who knowingly make fraudulent statements during the course of an offer.
This offense carries up to a $10,000 fine and/or five years in jail. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-
2-3-9 (Burns Supp. 1976).
16' Most, but not all, states require an offeror about to make a regulated offer to con-
sent to service of process. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-4-11 (Interim Supp. 1976).
166 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.21(1) (West Spec. Pamph. 1976).
167 Id.
16 IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-10(b) (Burns Supp. 1976); Act No. 44, § 1510(B), 1976
La. Sess. Law Serv. 29 (West), [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 21,161 (to be codified
as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1510(B) (West)).
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due diligence defense.' 69 In addition, in states where "offeror" has
been defined broadly, strict liability without the defense of due
diligence may attach to certain parties connected with the of-
feror. 170 The Kansas and Ohio statutes do not provide specific
enforcement mechanisms for tender-offer violations, but incorpo-
rate by reference the state's blue sky enforcement provisions.'
71
F. The Effects of State Regulation
Although state tender-offer regulation aims to "protect inves-
tors," the measures designed to afford this protection do little to
serve the interests of the investors who the law is supposed to
benefit.172 The primary effect of this legislation lies in the added
burdens it imposes on the offeror. Moreover, the "waiting period"
and "hearing" provisions of the law place in the hands of hostile
target management the most potent weapon in a tender-offer
fight: time. State tender-offer legislation fails to balance the com-
peting interests involved in a tender offer. Potential offerors facing
restrictive laws are discouraged from proceeding with a takeover
bid since losing can be extremely costly in terms of time, effort,
and money. Furthermore, the statutes also invite burdensome suits
against the offeror. Thus, one can reasonably predict that state
regulation will discourage offerors from engaging in takeover
attempts.' 7 3 In fact, as risk and expense increase, the tender offer
becomes no more attractive than the cumbersome proxy battle,
which the tender offer was designed to replace as the primary
method of gaining corporate control.' 74
These benefits to incumbent management may in turn induce
169 IDAHO CODE § 30-1511(2) (Supp. 1976).
170E.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1975).
171 KAN. STAT. § 17-1283 (1974); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(E) (Page Supp.
1975).
172 See notes 42-43, 96-98 and accompanying text supra.
13 See Brudney, supra note 7, at 624; Cohen, supra note 5, at 151-52.
114 Brudney, supra note 7, at 620-24. See also Metz, Market Place: States Defiant on
Takeovers, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1969, at 62, col. 7.
Some evidence suggests that state takeover-offer statutes are having this restrictive ef-
fect. An offer made in 1975 by the General Cable Corporation for control of Microdot,
Inc., was effectively defeated by the Ohio legislation. During the waiting period Microdot
threatened to liquidate and make a liquidating distribution to shareholders that purportedly
would have exceeded the tender- price. This effectively "whipsawed" the company's own
shareholders. One Microdot official stated that "[w]ithout the protection of Ohio law, we'd
be dead now. We wouldn't have had time to toss up this defense." FORBES, Feb. 1, 1976, at
24, 27-28. Of course, the offeror or a Microdot shareholder might sue Microdot's man-
agement for breach of fiduciary duty or for fraudulent practices; the offer, however, was
dead.
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potential target corporations to reincorporate in regulating juris-
dictions. Indeed, a number of major corporations allegedly have
already done so.' 75 Moreover, other states may adopt tender-offer
legislation in self-defense. As more states adopt such regulation,
federal policy will be displaced, and thus become increasingly ir-
relevant.
State legislation may also discourage other necessary parties
from supporting the offeror's bid. Banks, whose identity will be
disclosed as a source of funds,17 6 may hesitate to make credit avail-
able to an offeror for fear of collateral consequences. Arbi-
trageurs-indispensable if an offer is to succeed' 77 -generally
make a profit only if an offer is successful; hence, state regulation
limiting the probability of an offer's success will discourage ar-
bitrageurs.' 7 8 Finally, participating broker-dealers may be unwill-
ing to risk liability as participants in an "illegal offer." Even if these
persons do not abandon their support of an offer, they will at least
demand more in return-in increased interest, premium demands,
and commissions-for the additional risks incurred as a result of
the regulation.
The resulting decrease in the attractiveness of tender offers
may have undesirable repercussions. Shareholders of companies
with inefficient management lose the opportunity to sell their un-
dervalued shares at a premium.' 79 Diminished use of tender offers
may ensconce inefficient management. 8" The realization that take-
overs may promote economic efficiency led the Attorney General's
Committee on Securities Regulation in Ontario, Canada to reject
proposals that would have placed limits on the offeror's tactical
advantages.' 8' At least the Williams Act makes some effort to bal-
ance the interests of the target's management, target's share-
holders, and the offeror.' 82 In this sense, the state legislation may
175 Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 26, col. 1.
176 Williams Act § 13(d)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(B) (1970), specifically allows the
offeror to refrain from naming any bank as its source of funds, presumably in order to
protect against the possibility of adverse reaction to the bank's support of an unpopular
offeror.
177 See FORBES, Feb. 1, 1976, at 24, 25. See also E. ARANOW & H. EiNHORN, supra note 4,
at 173-74; note 95 supra.
178 See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 4, at 184-85; Note, supra note 57, at
1134-35.17
' See Brudney, supra note 7, at 632-34.
'8
0 Id. at 627-34; Metz, supra note 174.
18 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN
ONTARIO (KmIBER REPORT) 20-22 (1965).
182 See note 31 supra.
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indeed, as SEC Commissioner Loomis has noted, 183 conflict with
federal securities policy, if not with the Williams Act itself.
Of course, state takeover-bid statutes do not signal the death
of all tender offers subject to state regulation. The claim of one of
the proponents of the Ohio law is clearly overstated:
The real impact of the law, in my opinion, will be felt not so
much in its application as in its hovering omnipresence. I sus-
pect, so far as Ohio and Ohio-based corporations are concerned,
the corporate takeover as a form of corporate warfare is a thing
of the past. Acquisitions will hereafter be negotiated. If man-
agement is unresponsive to the desires of shareholders it will be
removed by proxy contest carried on in the open rather than by
the secretly organized surprise attack which has, up to now,
characterized the take-over bid.' 84
Contested takeover bids made in compliance with state law have
been attempted with some instances of success.'8 5 The Wisconsin
state securities commissioner has, by his administrative interpreta-
tion of that state's law, demonstrated a desire to harmonize state
and federal law and to accommodate, the reasonable interests of the
offeror.1 8 6 Moreover, the target is still limited in its defensive ac-
tivities by anti-fraud and fiduciary duty rules under state and fed-
eral law. Thus, the outlook must not be one of total pessimism.'8 7
But the "chill" produced by the state statutes remains. The
protection afforded by the statutes will prevent shareholders from
making decisions for themselves. On the whole, then, the state
statutes are not in the best interest of the investor nor in the public
interest. They are designed primarily to serve the interest of en-
trenched incumbent management, and they conflict with federal
securities policy. And, they may be unconstitutional.
183 N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1976, at 45, col. 7.
184 Vorys, supra note 10, at 73.
185 Indeed, the EZ Paintr case was a successful bid made in compliance with the Wis-
consin law. Nonetheless, the successful offeror settled with certain plaintiffs to extinguish
various anti-fraud claims. See EZ Paintr v. Newell Cos., 65 F.R.D. 372 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
1861n re EZ Paintr Corp. & Newell Cos., [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,063
(Wis. Comm'r of Sec., Jan. 30, 1973). More recently, however, the Wisconsin securities
commissioner has questioned whether the various state tender-offer statutes-including
that of his own state-are really in the public interest, and urged legislative reconsidera-
tion. See [1976] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 375, atA-10 to-11.
" See Lewis, An Inside Look at the Williams Act, reprinted in 3 SEC '75 177, 182-83
(1975) (effects of state legislation discussed).
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II
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATE LEGISLATION
The anti-takeover bias of the twenty-three state tender-offer
statutes, their extraterritorial scope, and their chilling effect on
nationwide bids for corporate control raise constitutional questions.
The federal system tolerates a "dual sovereignty" between the fed-
eral government and the states: matters affecting interstate com-
merce are primarily a federal concern, but the state legislatures in
exercising their police power may assert control over matters relat-
ing to the welfare of their citizens. Both commerce clause and
preemption analysis focus first on the balance between state
sovereignty and the need for national action to meet national
needs.' 88 More precisely, if the effect of tender-offer legislation on
interstate commerce outweighs the competence of the states to ac-
count for national interests, then only the federal government
should be empowered to regulate in this area. Moreover, if Con-
gress has acted in the same field as a state, the question is whether
the national legislative body is more competent to react politically
to the interests affected by the legislation than the state legislatures.
States may regulate the governance of corporations and act to pre-
vent fraud, but tender-offer legislation does not serve those in-
terests. Rather, these laws stem from a desire of certain states to
provide protection for local industry against "foreign" raiders.
Such legislation may impair significant national interests. If those
interests are unduly sacrificed to parochial concerns, then state
tender-offer legislation cannot withstand constitutional challenge.
,'8 See South Carolina State H'wy Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2
(1938), where the Court stated:
Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opin-
ion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally
upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those
political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects ad-
versely some interests within the state.
See Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 15 (1937); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litiga-
tion, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89
HARV. L. REV. 682, 712-13 (1976). There are also other matters of concern in both com-
merce clause and preemption analysis, e.g., problems of motivation and frustration of legis-
lative purpose. But inquiry, at least in the hard cases, usually focuses on whether the reg-
ulating state can reasonably be said to have something to add to the legal system because of
its unique ability to consider problems, concerns, and interests that, due to some local
characteristics, are not amenable to nationwide solution.
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A. The Commerce Clause
In 1917 the Supreme Court held that blue sky laws were
constitutional; 1 9 opponents of the laws unsuccessfully argued that
the legislation imposed a "negative burden" on interstate com-
merce. The Court rejected this argument, finding that in the ab-
sence of federal legislation the police power of the states allowed
only them to protect investors from fraud. 90 When Congress
passed the first federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934, it ex-
pressly provided that blue sky laws were not preempted by the
congressional action.' 91 But state tender-offer legislation is more
analogous to general corporation law than to blue sky law.' 92
Therefore, the commerce clause problems raised by these new
forms of securities regulation must be freshly examined, and un-
fortunately, precedent provides little guidance for an adequate
disposition of the issue.
One can argue that the anti-takeover bias of the laws alone
renders them constitutionally suspect. Such a challenge would
force courts to examine the motivation of state legislators in
passing a law, a difficult task that courts are not well-equipped
to handle.' 93 In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Supreme Court
struck down an Arizona statute that required cantaloupes grown
in-state to be processed in-state, finding that the sole purpose of
the act was to boost the state's agricultural reputation. The Court
stated that it "viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requir-
ing operations to be performed in the home state that could be
more efficiently performed elsewhere."' 195 One commentator has
suggested that state tender-offer legislation must be invalidated if
its only purpose is to maintain local management. 96 Even though
the original impetus for the legislation might be suspect, the stat-
utes nevertheless do serve a proper legislative objective-protec-
tion of both shareholders and the corporation from fraud or over-
reaching in the course of tender offers. Thus, unlike the Pike
9 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
190 Id. at 552-57.
191 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970); Securities
Act of 1933, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1970). See generally Smith, State "Blue Sky" Laws and the
Federal Securities Acts, 34 MIcH. L. REV. 1135 (1936).192 See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
9
' See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 320-23 (9th ed.
1975).
194 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
195 Id. at 145.
196 See Note, supra note 57, at 1158-59.
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statute which served only one purpose, these statutes serve mul-
tiple ends. The states have chosen between the interests of the
target and the offeror. This choice may have been one-sided and
unwisely parochial, but it is doubtful that courts would intervene
merely because the legislation did not sufficiently weigh the in-
terests of all parties involved. Pike provides no support for striking
down laws that arguably serve a rational and legitimate state end.
Southern Pacific Railroad v. Arizona'97 has also been relied on in
attacking the validity of the takeover-bid statutes.198 The United
States Supreme Court struck down an Arizona law limiting the
length of railroad trains moving through the state. The Court held
both that the law burdened interstate commerce because it forced a
carrier to conform to a new set of regulations each time it crossed
into a new state and that the need for a uniform national system of
railroad regulation outweighed any Arizona interest in protecting
the safety of its citizens. Southern Pacific is not dispositive either. 199
The need for uniformity in securities regulation is not com-
pelling. 00 Thus, there is little to distinguish the tender-offer prob-
lem from the commerce clause issue raised by blue sky law gener-
ally. Nor does the state legislation discriminate against other states,
thereby motivating them to retaliate against the regulating state;
hence, no "balkanization" effect results.20 1
Although the major precedents for attacking the state legisla-
tion are not compelling, those supporting state regulation of ten-
der offers are hardly persuasive. In Huron-Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit,20 2 the Supreme Court upheld a city anti-pollution
197 325 U.S. 761 (1945). See Note, supra note 57, at 1160-61.
198 Note, supra note 57, at 1161-62.
199 Moreover, Southern Pacific may lack doctrinal foundation in constitutional law.
Compare Southern Pacific R.R. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), and Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), with South Carolina State H'wy Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303
U.S. 177 (1938), and Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968). It appears
that an ad hoc balancing approach has been adopted by the Court, notwithstanding its
reliance on such concepts as "direct" and "indirect" burdens. See Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
200 Indeed, corporations law has traditionally been viewed as primarily a state law con-
cern. H. HENN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 18-22 (2d ed. 1970).
201 The "balkanization" concept (see H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,
537-39 (1949)) suggests that if one state is allowed to erect "hostile economic barriers"
inhibiting free trade with other states, those states will erect retaliatory barriers. This is
absent in the takeover-bid context, for the states do not direcdy infringe on the interests of
other states. When other states are forced to adopt their own anti-takeover laws in order to
preserve their attractiveness as incorporating states, it is more a result of "healthy" compe-
tition than hostility between states.
202 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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ordinance as applied to shipping traffic on the Great Lakes. Noting
that pollution was an acute local concern, the majority opinion held
that "[s]tate regulation, based on the police power, which does not
discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its
required uniformity, may constitutionally stand. 20 3 And in Parker
v. Brown,2 °4 the Court upheld California's scheme of raisin market-
ing regulation, even though ninety-five percent of the regulated
raisins were sold out-of-state. These cases deal with efforts to solve
problems of legitimate local concern. In both instances, the Court
noted that the problems involved consideration of peculiarly local
interests to which Congress could not adequately direct its atten-
tion.20 5 Tender offers, in contrast, are remarkably similar wherever
made; local knowledge of geography or agricultural conditions is
not germane to legislative regulation of tender offers. Moreover,
Congress has attempted to deal with the problem.
In the absence of dispositive analogy, then, balancing the rel-
evant state and federal interests central to commerce clause
analysis of tender-offer legislation is necessary. This Article has
demonstrated that the need for equal treatment of shareholders
and state interests in assuring the orderly transfer of corporate
control gives the target's state of incorporation the primary interest
in regulating tender offers.20 6 The same interests carry over into
commerce clause analysis. Additionally, no alternative forms of
regulation, less global in reach and less burdensome on interstate
commerce, could effectively serve the legitimate state interests in
this area.20 ' These arguments support the right of the state of
incorporation to regulate tender offers under a commerce clause
analysis, but the arguments lose force when a state other than the
state of incorporation is involved. A commerce clause challenge to
the law must not be so broad as to threaten the undoubted power
of the state to enact general corporation laws.2 08
203 Id. at 448.
204 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
'0 In terms of the competency model, neither the raisin marketing methods in Cal-
ifornia, nor the pollution characteristics of the Detroit area were subjects that Congress
could be expected to investigate adequately or act upon. See Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1960); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1943).
Since the regulations were directly effective only in-state, local legislation was permissible.
'o
6 See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
207 The impact of the Williams Act is not yet being considered in this analysis, even
though it may be seen as a "less intrusive alternative" to the state regulation. See Note,
supra note 57, at 1161-62.
201 See also note 55 supra.
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Indeed; the Supreme Court has accepted the primacy of the
incorporating state's legislative jurisdiction over the rights and
duties of shareholders. Such jurisdiction is a prerequisite to a
workable system of law that places responsibility for corporate reg-
ulation on the states. For instance, in Broderick v. Rosner,2 9 New
York law made shareholders of a banking corporation liable for
certain corporate debts. Since New York, the state of incorpora-
tion, was the dominant corporate legislator,210 the full faith and
credit clause required New Jersey courts to entertain an action
brought by the Superintendent of Banks of New York,21' even
though a New Jersey statute barred the action. Although interstate
commerce was affected, the commerce clause was not an issue in
this case. It would have been anomalous, however, to require the
incorporating state to police the extraterritorial actions of the cor-
poration while denying it out-of-state enforcement. 21 2
On the other hand, the extraterritorial reach of one state's
tender-offer legislation may deny citizens of another state the
power to choose their own way of regulating tender offers. For
instance, one state legislature might wish to promote tender offers,
yet other states could effectively thwart that goal by imposing re-
strictive regulations on companies making nationwide offers. Thus
the will of the citizens of some states would bend to the will of the
citizens of more restrictive states.213 Where the relevant transac-
tions are individual rather than corporate, a single governing law is
not essential, but a parochial constituency should not be the gov-
erning source of rules. The proper choice between the two sets of
interests is not obvious, and no answer is forthcoming.21 4 The solu-
tion would be easier if our legal system presumed that federal
corporation law controlled "national" corporations. 215
209 294 U.S. 629 (1935).210 Id. at 643.
2 11 Id. at 647.
212 Indeed, the commerce clause might compel the choice of a single state's corporate
law. See Horowitz, supra note 53, at 816.
212 Arguably the target company's shareholders' choice to become owners of an enter-
prise incorporated outside of their home state implies their acceptance of the law govern-
ing that jurisdiction, even though they have no voice in its formulation. But this theory
presupposes that the corporate management will act as the shareholders' representative in
the political process. This is a questionable assumption when, as here, such representation
would involve an element of self-dealing.214 But see Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687, 702 (1975);
Note, supra note 57, at 1173; note 258 and accompanying text infra.
215 A policy analysis of this question using the competency model would conclude that
Congress is the appropriate body for consideration of much corporate regulation, since the
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When jurisdiction is based on factors other than the place
of incorporation, the outcome is clearer. The state of the target
company's corporate headquarters does not traditionally have the
responsibility of assuring equality among the target's shareholders.
Moreover, if more than one state may regulate, conflict is inevita-
ble and the stricter law will control corporate actions. In this situa-
tion, the policies favoring application of the internal-affairs doc-
trine-fairness, convenience, and certainty-disappear. Only the
state's interest in the local assets of the target corporation re-
mains, and it is doubtful that persuasive reasons exist to justify
comprehensive regulation based only upon this interest.2 16 On the
other hand, the commerce clause arguments against validity apply
equally to any state regulation, and the balance must then be struck
against the state's power to regulate.
B. Federal Preemption
Federal law preempts state law if state law conflicts with the
letter or intent of a federal law, or if the federal law so occupies the
regulated field that no local legislation is permissible. 217 Preemp-
tion law, like commerce clause analysis, requires a balancing of
state and federal interests. 21 8 In preemption analysis, however, the
federal interest is not inchoate but concrete; the only question is
whether a state law can be effectively reconciled with an existing
federal regulatory scheme. Preemption analysis of state tender-
offer legislation presents the narrower problem of analyzing fed-
eral and state laws that contain identical subject matter, rather than
the more common conflict between varying national and local
policies.21 9
effect of that regulation is felt nationwide. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701-03 (1974). However, firmly-established state law prac-
tice would be politically difficult to displace.
216 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970). Furthermore, the state
probably has a "less restrictive alternative" (Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 355
(1951)) to the extent that the state can regulate the targe's assets directly by rules relating
to improper use.
217 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947).
218 See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger
Court, 75 COLUm. L. REv. 623, 641 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Preemption Doctrine];
Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 13 STAN. L. REV.
208, 225 (1959). See also Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV.
51 (1973).
219 Thus, some of the more difficult problems in preemption analysis are absent; i.e.,
those created when both the state and national regulations are directed at valid and impor-
tant but nonetheless different concerns, with resulting frustration of the federal policy.
The competency allocation model is most helpful in the takeover-bid context, where the
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Several commentators contend that the Williams Act does not
pose a preemption question because section 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 expressly "saves" all state securities legis-
lation.220 That section states:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the se-
curities commission (or any agency or officer performing like
functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as
it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder.221
But the applicability of this provision to state tender-offer legisla-
tion is extremely questionable because section 28(a), written in
1934, acknowledged concurrent jurisdiction between the federal
laws and state blue sky laws. State blue sky laws were well-es-
tablished before 1934,222 and Congress understood their opera-
tion when it drafted the federal legislation. Therefore, Congress
intended that the states retain their traditional jurisdiction. 223 State
takeover-bid statutes radically depart from localized blue sky prac-
tice: they are more akin to "corporation" law than to "securities"
law. 2 24 It is therefore too mechanical to suggest that the savings
clause was intended to save this more aggressive state legislation.
Furthermore, since the tender-offer laws did not exist when the
Williams Act was adopted, Congress may not have given tacit ap-
proval to concurrent state regulation. When, as here, subsequent
state legislation is not of substantially the same character as those
laws Congress intended to save, traditional preemption analysis
supplants the savings clause, even if the clause might literally ap-
pear to protect the state statute.225
A number of tenuous analogies have been drawn to settled
preemption principles in challenging the constitutionality of ten-
der-offer statutes. For example, the preemption doctrine applies
state and federal laws deal with exactly the same problem, reaching facially similar solu-
tions. Yet, on occasion, the state laws are broader in intent and relate to duties which are
not the subject of federal regulation. In this case, the more common preemption questions
are apposite.
2
. See Shipman, supra note 10, at 759-60; Vaughan, supra note 10, at 881; Comment,
supra note 10, at 335.
221 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. V 1975). But see Note, supra note 57, at 1165-68; Moylan,
supra note 214, at 694-97.
222 See generally Smith, supra note 191.
22See Crosby v. Weil, 382 Ill. 538, 48 N.E.2d 386 (1943).224 See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
225 See Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 540-41
(1972).
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when "[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it."' 226 Thus, it can be argued that the re-
quirement of national uniformity in tender-offer regulation is so
necessary that even in the absence of express congressional intent,
no state laws are permissible. This principle formed the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Termi-
nal, Inc.,227 in which the Court struck down a system of local air-
craft noise pollution laws because of the paramount national in-
terest in a standard aviation policy.228 A student commentator has
cited Burbank as persuasive authority for federal preemption of
state tender-offer statutes. 2 29 But the Williams Act, unlike the Fed-
eral Aviation Agency regulations at issue in Burbank, is not a de-
tailed, comprehensive regulatory scheme. The Williams Act merely
provides minimum disclosure standards230 for the conduct of ten-
der offers and is not so comprehensive that stricter state rules are
necessarily inconsistent with national policy.
A second principle-that state laws must not conflict with a
federal statutory scheme-is more. apposite.23 ' Although simul-
taneous compliance with the Williams Act and any of the state
statutes is possible without risk of inconsistent liability, 23 2 preemp-
tion may still be a problem when the application of state law frus-
trates the purposes or policies served by a federal statute.233 But
the "purposes or policies" underlying the Williams Act are not
clear, making the preemption analysis more difficult. For instance,
the federal statute's legislative history shows that Congress wished
disclosure to be "educative" but did not wish to destroy the incen-
226 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
227 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
22
s Id. at 633.
229 Note, supra note 57, at 1165.
230 See Shipman, supra note 10, at 759-60.
231 Moreover, if the § 28(a) savings clause does apply to state takeover-bid statutes, it is
still possible to argue that the laws "conflict" with the federal legislation, and therefore are
not saved. See Note, supra note 57, at 1168. However, the federal savings clause may still
protect state legislation unless there is an actual conflict between the statutes (see Smith,
supra note 191, at 1160-61), which is not the case here. From a policy standpoint, once it is
clear that the savings clause covers a particular state act, the conflict standard should be
literally construed, i.e., requiring an actual conflict. Inquiry into more subjective pos-
sibilities of conflict is precisely the purpose of general preemption analysis that would ren-
der the savings clause meaningless if undertaken in every case.
2 2 See Shipman, supra note 10, at 741; Note, supra note 10, at 334.
23 3 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); G.
GUNTHER, supra note 193, at 673-78.
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tive for takeover bids.234 Indeed, the concept of disclosure prior to
making a bid was expressly rejected. 235 By contrast, state statutes
providing for expensive pre-bid disclosure may effectively destroy
the incentive to bid. If state statutes conflict with the balance struck
between offeror and offeree interests by federal takeover-bid dis-
closure law, then the state laws are invalid. 236
This may prove too much for some. Most federal laws are
limited to certain circumstances, and those limits are often selected
for substantive policy reasons. Even though there are perceived
reasons for the federal government's failure to extend the regula-
tion to its permissible limits, to infer preemption would permit
invalidation of most state laws that operate in the same field, and
tend to eviscerate the distinction between the "occupation" and
"conflict" preemption standards. In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul,237 the Supreme Court upheld a California regulation
governing the oil content of avocados sold in-state. Out-of-state
growers challenged the state scheme on the grounds that federal
law had preempted the stricter state standards by establishing a
minimum oil content for avocados. The Court ruled that more
stringent state statutes might stand even when they dealt with the
same problem as a federal law and effectively replaced the federal
legislation on a local level.238 "Minimum standard"-type national
regulation is not per se indicative of preemption.2 39 The state regu-
lation may stand so long as dual compliance is possible, no demon-
strated need for national uniformity exists, and the local law ra-
tionally deals with a legitimate local problem.
The federal avocado regulation provided standards that at-
tempted to balance consumer and producer interests. The stricter
state standards rejected that balance but withstood constitutional
challenge. If the Williams Act merely sets minimum standards for
tender-offer regulation, then states may be free to strengthen them
without facing preemption. 240 The persuasive authority of Florida
Lime does, however, have limits; the legislative history of the Wil-
234 See S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967), 113 CONG. REC. 24665 (1967).
235 Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1968); see also note
99 and accompanying textsupra.
23 See Note, supra note 57, at 1168.
237 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
23 8 Id. at 145.
239 Id.
211 See Shipman, supra note 10, at 759-60.
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liams Act clearly expresses the desire not to destroy tender offers
in toto. The Act concerns a matter of national importance, whereas
the avocado regulation challenged in Florida Lime related to a local
industry, was enacted by an administrative agency, and was not
supported by a clear statement of purpose.2 4' If preemption an-
alysis of state takeover-bid legislation is directed only at the actual
provisions of the Act, the state laws would survive because there is
no facial conflict between state laws and the Williams Act, and
compliance with both the state and federal statutes is possible.
Recent cases suggest that under current preemption theory,
state laws will be presumed valid where there is only a potential
conflict with federal law. 42 For instance, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware2 43 the Supreme Court allowed Califor-
nia to refuse to enforce a compulsory arbitration clause in an em-
ployment contract. The New York Stock Exchange, exercising
administrative authority delegated by the federal securities law,
required such a clause in securities dealers' contracts to limit ad-
verse publicity arising from public airing of employment disputes
in the securities industry. Although the Court's decision seems to
rest in part on the semi-private character of the "federal" rule,2 44
the decision at least evidences an "accommodationist" perspective
toward state interests.
Despite these difficulties, the state statutes should fall under
preemption attack if only because they frustrate the clear legislative
intent of the Williams Act.2 45 There is, however, an even stronger
reason to support preemption. The "accommodationist" preemp-
tion decisions have upheld state laws primarily local in scope. But
in the takeover-bid context, the state statutes operate extraterritor-
ially and impose their formulation of the proper balance among
241 In the language of the competency model, the affected interests in Florida Lime
were better voiced in the state legislature than in Congress or the administrative agency.
242 See The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 218, at 651-52.
243 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
244 See The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 218, at 649.
245 In addition, § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970),
gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal securities law violations, suggest-
ing at least some congressional desire to confer "protective" jurisdiction over claims that
are nationwide in effect. Of course, state courts are also expressly given the power to hear
certain claims dealing with the same subject, e.g., blue sky law violations. State securities
and state corporations law standards can be distinguished on the basis of the latter's
wide-ranging and extraterritorial effect. In this sense, it may be impermissible to allow a
state court to find that an entire tender offer violates a rule prohibiting fraudulent prac-
tices in the course of takeover bids; according to § 27 that sort of ruling is the exclusive
responsibility of the federal court under § 14(e) of the Williams Act.
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interests on affected but "unenfranchised" parties. The role of
extraterritoriality in preemption doctrine has not been carefully
considered in the cases or commentary, but it has clearly been sig-
nificant in judicial attempts to weigh state against national inter-
ests in constitutional law.
In Goldstein v. California,2 46 for example, the Supreme Court
upheld a California record-piracy statute against arguments that
the federal copyright laws preempted the field. The Court approv-
ingly noted that the laws had no real extraterritorial effect: they
would not "prejudice the interest of other States"247 that might
wish to allow free appropriation of nonprotected intellectual prop-
erty. The Eighth Circuit decision in Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota -2 48 is even more persuasive. There the court struck down
state nuclear radiation safety standards that were stricter than
those promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The
court cited a number of independent reasons for finding the state
rule preempted but emphasized that the nuclear facility in ques-
tion, although located in and affecting the safety of the regulating
states, provided energy for a three-state region and formed part of
a national power grid.249 The state regulation was effectively ex-
traterritorial, and hence was impermissible in the presence of ade-
quate federal standards. The court wrote:
Were the states allowed to impose stricter standards on the level
of radioactive waste releases discharged from nuclear power
plants, they might conceivably be so overprotective in the area of
health and safety as to unnecessarily stultify the industrial de-
velopment and use of atomic energy for the production of elec-
tric power.250
Since national energy policy was directly affected by any attempt to
regulate safety standards,, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
appropriate body to deal with standards was an agency serving a
national constituency-the AEC.
The court in Northern States echoed the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court in First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power
Commission,251 in which the Court refused to allow Iowa to require
246 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
247 MId. at 558.
248 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
249 Id. at 1153.
250 id. at 1154.
251 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
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a permit for the construction of a dam on a navigable state river,
where the applicant had already received a permit from the FPC.
The opinion clearly rested on the notion of political competency,
concluding that "[i]t is the Federal Power Commission rather than
the Iowa Executive Council that under our constitutional Govern-
ment must pass upon these issues on behalf of the people of Iowa
as well as on behalf of all others. 25 2
A similar analysis of state tender-offer legislation leads to the
conclusion that the Williams Act is preemptive. State takeover-bid
statutes increase the risk that tender offers will fail when made for
corporations with the requisite contacts in regulating states. But the
affected states and persons whose interests favor takeovers are
given no opportunity to participate in the legislative decision. If
Congress, where all such interests are represented, has already
legislated in a particular area, and state regulation in the same area
protects only parochial interests, 253 then the congressional scheme
ought to be preemptive. This result is especially appropriate where
there has been no demonstration that peculiarly local needs are
served by concurrent state regulation, and where it is clear that
Congress took account of all potentially relevant interests affected
by the law at the time of passage.254 It may on occasion be difficult
to tell when a statute has an extraterritorial reach justifying the
application of the preemption doctrine. However, it is clear that
the state tender-offer statutes are well beyond the fringe.255
Furthermore, the existence of the Williams Act removes many
of the internal-affairs interests that might justify state regulation
under commerce clause analysis. The federal law provides unifor-
mity, convenience, and certainty for supervising tender offers and
assures that every shareholder will be protected. Practical choice-
of-law considerations justifying the extraterritorial application of
state law have disappeared. Moreover, state responsibility for the
252 1d. at 182.
253 This would be true even if all 50 states were to adopt anti-takeover statutes, for
national economic interests cannot be sufficiently represented in any single state legisla-
ture.
254 The same conclusion can probably be reached with regard to preemption of state
takeover-bid statutes relating solely to insurance companies. See note 10 supra. Although
issues such as policyholder protection may be primarily a concern of the states, it seems
preferable for states to provide such protection directly by attacking insurance company
abuses, rather than indirectly through regulation of sales by shareholders pursuant to ten-
der offers. See generally Wilder, Regulation of the Insurance Industry Under the Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 7 CONN. L. REv. 711 (1975).
255 Naturally, all state regulation of commerce is extraterritorial to some extent, for it
inevitably affects interests operating both inside and outside the state.
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governance of corporations has been effectively assumed by the
federal law. 256 Thus, states cannot claim that their interest in pro-
tecting the integrity of domestic corporations will be totally unpro-
tected if state law is preempted. In this sense, there is preemption
only when Congress has expressly acted to deal with a problem;
state corporation laws generally, though equally extraterritorial,
are not affected.257
The balance, then, favors federal preemption of state take-
over-bid legislation. Courts or Congress can act to declare the Wil-
liams Act preemptive, but congressional action would damage state
sensibilities less. 58 It is therefore appropriate to examine federal
256 The argument that a state always has responsibility for the "creatures" that it has
created, i.e., its domestic corporations, rests on an anachronistic fiction and should give way
to the idea that corporate regulation should be allocated to various jurisdictions on the
basis of convenience and certainty. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 48, at 1126.
257 Of course, preemption would arise only in an "as applied" context. To the extent
that a particular state's law applies to companies not regulated under the Williams Act, that
regulation is permissible. As to specific provisions in the state statutes for which there are
no counterparts in federal law (e.g., the controlling shareholder responsibility rules), there
would presumably be no preemption either because such provisions are usually proper
subjects for state law fiduciary duty analysis, which state legislatures are apparently more
"competent" to consider. On the other hand, those provisions relating to supervision of the
tender-offer process itself would fall.
258 This recommendation has been echoed by the American Bar Association's Sub-
committee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal Securities Regulation
Committee. See [1976] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 370, at A-5. See generally Note,
Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208
(1959). In testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, in February, 1976, then SEC Commissioner Loomis expressed his opinion that state
tender-offer legislation is unconstitutional, and that Congress should act to preempt it. His
testimony is reproduced in 1 J. FLOm, M. LIPToN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 4, at
255-69. Moreover, there are procedural difficulties to mounting a successful judicial attack
on the state statutes. To the extent that the dominant effect of the legislation is to "chill"
even attempts to make takeover bids, it may be hard to find plaintiffs with the requisite
standing to bring the case. Those planning bids will not wish to go into court and an-
nounce their plans as a method of gaining standing, for that would weaken their chances
of success just as if they had complied with the statute. The costs of noncompliance if the
constitutional challenge is lost make it unlikely that offerors will disregard the statutes and
clhallenge their constitutionality only in an enforcement proceeding. Finally, complying
with the statute and simultaneously attacking it in court is problematic because compliance
makes it more likely that the bid will fail and that the case will become effectively, if not
legally, mood. The only hope is to obtain an immediate injunction or declaratory judgment
against enforcement of the state law, a course that is itself filled with both procedural and
constitutional difficulties.
In its attempt to take over the Youngstown Steel Door Company, the Thrall Car Man-
ufacturing Company complied with the Ohio statute and then filed suit in United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking a declaratory judgment against
that statute on commerce clause, preemption, due process, and equal protection grounds.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1976, at 47, col. 3. However, soon thereafter Thrall announced that
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legislation that could deal with the "hovering omnipresence" of the
state statutes.
III
POSTSCRIPT: LEGISLATIVE PREEMPTION
The reasons that should lead the courts to hold state tender-
offer statutes unconstitutional should also encourage Congress to
preempt them expressly, before judicial intervention is necessary.
Conveniently, Congress will have an opportunity to do so when it
considers the American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities
Code.2 59
The proposed Code revises some of the definitional provisions
of the Williams Act, but makes no major change in its substance.260
The offeror's advantages of speed and secrecy are preserved; no
advance notice or waiting period requirements are imposed. Ac-
cordingly, it can be assumed that the drafters of the Code intend to
strike the balance between offeror and target along the lines of the
Williams Act.
The proposed Code could deal with the preemption question
in several ways. Borrowing the Brandeisian idea that states should
be "laboratories" for social experimentation, Professor Shipman
has recommended against federal preemption for the present.26'
Shipman would not have courts or Congress act until empirical
evidence shows that the state laws do in fact reduce the number of
desirable tender offers. This recommendation is questionable, for
it is possible that the state legislation's dominant effect is a
"chill. '2 62 Potential offerors may decide that the increased risks of
failure are not worth the expected benefits of success, and simply
not engage in regulated bids. It is doubtful that the impact of this
chill could ever be properly measured or evaluated when so many
other factors influence the takeover-bid decision. Moreover, as
states react to existing laws by adopting similar legislation in self-
defense, these "experiments" could become de facto national pol-
icy. States would control bids for local companies during the trial
it was ending its bid for Youngstown. Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1976, at 31, col. 4. It is there-
fore uncertain whether the suit will be prosecuted.
259 See generally Loss, supra note 15.
20 Compare ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 299.9, 604-606 (Oct. 1974 Rptr's Revision of Text
of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970).
261 Shipman, supra note 10, at 760-6 1.
262 See text accompanying notes 173-78 supra.
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period, even though the political interests of the states are most
closely aligned with those of incumbent management. This prob-
lem would be highlighted in those states where an administrative
agency can effectively defeat a takeover bid by using its supervisory
power. Delaying preemption would threaten national policies ex-
pressed in the Williams Act without corresponding "educational
benefit" for the federal system.
Another suggestion, approaching the other extreme, rec-
ommends a federal rule that "[n]o State or political subdivision
thereof may adopt or enforce any regulations respecting tender
offers. 26 3 This provision would prohibit states from regulating
even those bids not subject to federal regulation, and therefore
preempts too much. The incorporating state has a legitimate in-
terest in protecting against improper takeover attempts. The non-
registrant exemption from federal control does not represent a
policy choice that bids for smaller companies should be uncontrol-
led, but instead reflects a judgment that, as a matter of conven-
ience, federal regulation cannot govern all corporations. Lack of a
federal-state conflict in policy with regard to nonregistered corpo-
rations permits the states freedom to legislate in the field. 26 4
The middle course-preemption only when the takeover bid is
federally regulated-has been adopted in section 1603(c)(1) of the
Code.265 The Comment to the preemption provision contains a
number of the arguments against state legislation discussed above:
(a) the state legislation tends to be pro-management in contrast
to the neutral tone of the federal provisions ... ; (b) the applica-
tion of the state legislation to foreign corporations.., introduces
needless complexity in an area already regulated by Congress;
and (c) it is just as well to make this area exclusively federal
before this sort of state legislation spreads. 266
This approach is preferable 267 for establishing the proper federal
263 Note, supra note 57, at 1173 (emphasis omitted).
'64 See text accompanying notes 255-57 supra.
26 5 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(c)(1) (Oct. 1974 Rptr's Revision of Text of Tent. Drafts
Nos. 1-3): "This Code is exclusive and plenary in the areas covered by [the Part dealing
with proxy solicitations and tender requests] to the extent that that part applies with re-
spect to a particular registrant."
266 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603, Comment 10 (Tent. Draft No. 3, April 1, 1.974).
.67 One rationale for preemption of state securities laws as applied to offerings, regu-
lated by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933, is that a division of competencies would
eliminate overlap, and lead to the most efficient allocation of skills and competencies. See
Loss, supra note 15, at 46. Such reasoning does not apply in the takeover-bid context be-
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
role in the regulation of takeover bids.2 1 1
Congress should consider incorporating some of the more use-
ful provisions of the state laws into the Code, although anti-
takeover bias should not play any part -in this consideration. Thus,
the state law "waiting period" should be abandoned, since its pri-
mary purpose is to discourage takeovers. 269 To the extent that the
waiting period provides the opportunity for information to reach
the shareholders, an extended period during which shares may be
withdrawn would serve the same objective without substantially in-
creasing the offer's risk of failure °.2 7  The Code could require con-
fidential pre-offer review by the SEC of the adequacy of the
offeror's disclosure, although it is not certain that such additional
compelled disclosure would be sufficient to outweigh increased
administrative burdens. 271 Aspects of state laws merely implemen-
tive of the disclosure policy-the durational requirements or the
rules granting access to shareholder lists, for instance-can be left
to the rule-making authority of the SEC. Finally, limiting the rights
of controlling shareholders to sell furthers the desirable end of
assuring shareholder equality. Matters touching the relationship of
shareholders inter sese should remain the province of state law, un-
less Congress is willing to acknowledge the propriety of federal
corporations law. In sum, little can be done to accommodate fur-
ther the interests of incumbent management unless the Code be-
comes an anti-takeover law; this would be neither desirable nor po-
litically necessary. 272
cause the federal administrative agency does not have extensive supervisory authority
over tender offers.
26 The Code's draftsmen may wish to revise the preemption provision so that only the
target's state of incorporation would be allowed to regulate bids not covered by federal law.
This would eliminate the uncertainty and conflict that can arise when more than one state
attempts to supervise a particular offer. Alternatively, the draftsmen may wish to require
those states regulating tender offers for nonregistrants to enact statutes consistent with
the federal disclosure standard. See Bateman, State Securities Registration: An Unresolved Di-
lemma and a Suggestion for the Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759, 789 (1973). Neverthe-
less, these suggestions do not deal with pressing problems and may be considered too great
an intrusion on state sensibilities.
219 See text accompanying notes 88-98 supra.
2 0 See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
271 See also text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
22 From a political standpoint, the "bandwagon" of states that have adopted takeover-
bid laws (see note 10 supra) might suggest that Congress should deal more strictly with
tender offerors. Two points argue against such a reaction. First, the incumbent manage-
ment interests that lobbied so effectively on the state level will have less impact in a national
forum, where scrutiny of their positions will be much more intense. Second, many states
appear to be adopting anti-takeover legislation solely as a means of staying competitive as
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CONCLUSION
State tender-offer statutes-global in scope and restrictive in
effect-are natural political responses in jurisdictions where the
interests of local enterprise are better represented than the in-
terests of the national economy. These laws frustrate federal pol-
icies expressed in the Williams Act, and therefore contravene the
Constitution, which allocates to Congress primary responsibility for
regulating those aspects of commerce that cannot be effectively
confined to a single geographical area. Congress should act to
preempt state laws insofar as they regulate the takeover of targets
registered under federal law, for only the federal government is
politically competent to regulate those takeover bids having a
major impact on the national economy.
attractive states in which to incorporate. To the extent that this is true, it is unlikely that
those states would object strenuously to a provision prohibiting all states from enacting
or enforcing local tender-offer statutes.
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